2 edition of Holdups, standard breach remedies, and optimal investment found in the catalog.
Holdups, standard breach remedies, and optimal investment
Aaron S. Edlin
Published
1995
by National Bureau of Economic Research in Cambridge, MA
.
Written in English
Edition Notes
| Statement | Aaron S. Edlin, Stefan Reichelstein. |
| Series | NBER working paper series -- working paper no. 5007, Technical working papers (National Bureau of Economic Research) -- no. 5007. |
| Contributions | Reichelstein, Stefan, 1957-, National Bureau of Economic Research. |
| The Physical Object | |
|---|---|
| Pagination | 39 p. : |
| Number of Pages | 39 |
| ID Numbers | |
| Open Library | OL22420307M |
A company's credit rating can be lowered in the aftermath of a data breach, and that can affect a company's ability to raise debt or renegotiate its existing debt, Deloitte said. The corporate credit rating of U.S. retailer Target was downgraded from "A+" to "A" in March by ratings agency Standard & Poor's months after a cyberattack. Asset specificity and holdups Benjamin Klein1 Specific assets are assets that have a significantly higher value within a particular transacting relationship than outside the relationship. To illustrate, consider the classic Fisher Body-General Motors case.2 In Fisher Body undertook a very large expansion in its capacity to supply bodies.
The hold-up problem has played an important role as a foundation of modern contract and organization theory, as the associated inefficiencies have justified many prominent organizational and contractual practices. We formally describe the main inefficiency hypothesis and sketch out the remedies suggested, as well as the more. 【Abstract】Law and economics has developed for nearly half a the development of law and economics is not only showed in the successful interdisciplinary integration of law and economics and the great impact and integration of the research paradigm of economics on the traditional law, but also its important impacts on judicial practice.
The economic analysis of contract law investigates various remedies for breach of contract. It is a common tenet that, in contrast to tort law, damage measures such as expectation or reliance damages typically fail to provide efficient incentives. 2 This discrepancy seems particularly puzzling because, in some countries at least, contract and. If so, even a minor security breach could seriously damage your company’s reputation — and lead to lawsuits. Take Zappos, for example. The online retailer, which is known for its stellar customer service, got hacked in January, and confidential customer information (including .
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Holdups, Standard Breach Remedies, and Optimal Investment Aaron S. Edlin, Stefan Reichelstein. NBER Working Paper No. (Also Reprint No. r) Issued in February NBER Program(s):Law and Economics.
We Holdups a bilateral trading problem in which one or both parties makes relationship-specific investments before by: "Holdups, Standard Breach Remedies, and Optimal Investment," NBER Working PapersNational Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
Joskow, Paul L, " Contract Duration and Relationship-Specific Investments: Empirical Evidence from Coal Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(1), pagesMarch. In contrast, expectation damages is poorly suited to solve bilateral investment problems. Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation Edlin, Aaron S.
and Reichelstein, Stefan J., Holdups, Standard Breach Remedies, and Optimal Investment (February ).Cited by: Downloadable. And optimal investment book Aaron S. Edlin & Stefan Reichelstein. Abstract: We consider a bilateral trading problem in which one or both parties makes relationship-specific investments before trade.
Without adequate contractual protection, the prospect of later holdups discourages investment. We postulate that the parties can sign noncontingent contracts prior to investing, and can freely.
Get this from a library. Holdups, standard breach remedies, and optimal investment. [Aaron S Edlin; Stefan Reichelstein; National Bureau of Economic Research.]. Berkeley Law From the SelectedWorks of Aaron Edlin June, Holdups, Standard Breach Remedies, and Optimal Investment Aaron S.
Edlin Stefan J. Reichelstein. Holdups, Standard Breach Remedies, standard breach remedies Optimal Investment. American Economic Review () We find that such contracts can induce one party to invest efficiently when courts impose either a breach remedy of specific performance or expectation damages.
Aaron S. Edlin and Stefan J. Reichelstein. "Holdups, Standard Breach Remedies, and. DOI: /w Corpus ID: Holdups, Standard Breach Remedies, and Optimal Investment @inproceedings{EdlinHoldupsSB, title={Holdups, Standard Breach Remedies, and Optimal Investment}, author={Aaron S.
Edlin and Stefan Reichelstein}, year={} }. Total downloads of all papers by Stefan J. Reichelstein. Skip to main content. Feedback to SSRN. Holdups, Standard Breach Remedies, and Optimal Investment. Downloads 61 (,) 2 Holdups, Standard Breach Remedies, and Optimal Investment. NBER Working Paper No.
w Number of pages: 43 Posted: 06 Sep Last Revised. American Economic Review - June (Vol. 86) [Orley Ashenfelter] on *FREE* shipping on qualifying offers.
American Economic Review - June (Vol. 86) Ride a Double Auction Roller Coaster" by Mark V. Van Boening and Nathaniel T. Wilcox "Holdups, Standard Breach Remedies, and Optimal Investment" by Aaron S. Edlin and Stefan Manufacturer: American Economic Association.
“ Holdups, Standard Breach Remedies, and Optimal Investment,” American Economic Review 86 (3): – Ethier, W. “ Regionalism in a Multilateral World,”. Holdups and Holdouts: What do They Have in Common. Holdups, Standard Breach Remedies, and Optimal Investment.
Article. when applied to a broad portfolio of high book-to-market firms, can. Abstract. The economic analysis of contract law is a vast subject that synchronises the theory of contract and legal premises.
In this book the author has attempted to cover a limited sphere that deals with incomplete contracting under asymmetric information. Aaron S. Edlin & Stefan Reichelstein, Holdups, Standard Breach Remedies, and Optimal Investment, 86 Am.
Econ. Rev () Friedrich Engels, The Origin Of. Edlin, A. S., & Reichelstein, S. Holdups, standard breach remedies, and optimal investment. The American Economic Review, – Google Scholar. Aaron S. Edlin and Stefan Reichelstein (), ‘Holdups, Standard Breach Remedies, and Optimal Investment’, American Economic Review, 86 (3), June, – 4.
Mathias Dewatripont and Jean Tirole (), ‘A Theory of Debt and Equity: Diversity of Securities and Manager-Shareholder Congruence’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, (4. Holdups, simple contracts and information acquisition. Author links open overlay panel Tian Zhu. Show more.
The firm should accept the contract and make the optimal investment decision. For related literature, Barzel, S. ReichelsteinHoldups, standard breach remedies, and optimal investment. American Economic Review, 86 (), pp.
''Holdups, Standard Breach Remedies, and Optimal Investment,'' 86(3) American Economic Review – –1Liquidated and Limited Damages and the Revision of Article 2: An Opportunity to. Edlin, Aaron S.; Reichelstein, Stefan () Holdups, standard breach remedies, and optimal investment.
Martimort, David The economic theory of incentives ; 2 The international library of critical writings in economics Cheltanham [u.a.] [Buchkapitel]. This article explores the specific contribution of recent literature on incomplete contracts in comparison with the acontractual Walrasian general equilibrium as well as the complete optimal contracts of the Agency theory regarding the institutional identity of agents.
It underlines a tension between the theoretical justification of contractual incompleteness on the one hand, and rationality. However, as Miguel Miranda, a director with Deloitte’s investment management practice notes, even one mistake can be expensive.
While two-thirds of respondents estimated that their breach costs at less than $10, apiece, at the high end 17 percent .book, 7 Law Quart. Rev. 65, displaying a penal bond from private agreements increased, the remedies for breach were bound up in the common law forms of action.
The penal remedy was linked in particular to the action of covenant, which by the mid- Stefan Reichelstein, Holdups, Standard Breach, and Optimal Investment, 86 AM. ECON.Holdup definition is - delay. How to use holdup in a sentence.
